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INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1984, high interest rates and favorable court decisions
encouraged the use of interest-free loans to accomplish a variety of
objectives from employee compensation to shareholder distributions.' Congress finally halted this movement by enacting new section 7872 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.2 This section
provides comprehensive taxation of below-market loans by treating
such loans as if they were made at a statutory rate of interest and
reflects a concerted effort by Congress to tax transactions involving
the time value of money consistently with economic reality.
This article examines the effect of section 7872 on business
loans. It begins by describing courts' attempts to determine the
proper tax consequences of below-market loans from the perspectives of both lenders and borrowers prior to the 1984 Act. It then
analyzes the tax treatment of demand and term loans, concluding
that although section 7872 resolves the inconsistencies created by
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; B.A. 1972, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota.
1. See, e.g., Dean v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961); Hardee v. United States, 708
F.2d 661, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Baker v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 166, 170-71 (1980), aff'd 677 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. 1324, 1327 (CCH 1980), aff'd 664 F.2d 315
(1st Cir. 1981); Parks v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. 1228, 1230 (CCH 1980), aff'd 686 F.2d 408 (6th
Cir. 1982); Marsh v. Comm'r, 73 T.C, 317, 328 (1979); Creel v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1173, 1179
(1979), aff'd sub nor. Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Greenspun v.
Comm'r, 72 T.C. 931, 946-52 (1979), aff'd 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Zager v. Comm'r, 72
T.C. 1009, 1013 (1979), affd sub nor. Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981);
Suttle v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. 1638, 1639 (CCH 1978), aff'd 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
2. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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the courts' refusal to properly tax below-market loans through
adoption of the two-transaction approach, it creates complexity in
valuation and may entrap unsuspecting taxpayers.

II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Courts grappled with the issue of the proper tax treatment of
interest-free loans for many years. With minor exceptions,3 they
refused to impute income to either borrowers or lenders or to allow
borrowers an interest deduction. The earliest cases concerned the
ability of borrowers to deduct alleged interest payments 5 and the
need for lenders to include imputed interest payments in gross income.' Later cases focused on including the value of the economic
benefit of an interest-free loan in the borrowers' gross income. 7 Finally, courts used section 482 to allocate the economic benefits of
an interest-free loan among related shareholders. 8
A. Pre-Dean Cases.
Prior to Dean v. Commissioner, issues concerning interest-free
loans arose in two contexts. In the first, courts rejected any attempt by borrowers to deduct interest paid on loans which were
apparently interest-free." In one case, the taxpayer lost because it
failed to meet the burden of proving that it had any obligation to
pay, or that it had in fact paid, interest.' 0 In another case, the taxpayer actually paid six percent interest on an interest-free loan."
The court disallowed the deduction because the taxpayer paid the
interest solely to create a deduction.' 2 In a third case, the court
simply refused to permit a deduction for interest paid where there
3. See Hardee v. United States, 82-2 USTC 1 9459 at 84,658 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Creel v.
Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1173, 1180 (1979), aff'd sub nor. Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th
Cir. 1981). But Hardee was reversed on appeal. Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
4. See cases cited infra notes 5-7.
5. See, e.g., D. Loveman & Son Export Co. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 776, 805 (1960), aff'd
296 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 860 (1962); Howell Turpentine Co. v.
Comm'r, 6 T.C. 364, 374 (1946); Rainbow Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1059
(1935).
6. See, e.g., Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 416, 447 (1960); Society Brand
Clothes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 304, 320-21 (1952); Combs Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 41
B.T.A. 339, 342 (1940).
7. See cases cited supra note 1.
8. See cases cited infra notes 31 and 34.
9. See cases cited supra note 5.
10. Rainbow Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r., 31 B.T.A. 1050, 1060 (1935).
11. Howell Turpentine Co. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 364, 374-75 (1946).
12. Id.
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was no legal obligation to pay that interest.'"
The second context in which courts dealt with the tax consequences of interest-free loans involved lenders who had lent shareholders or employees money with the understanding that no interest would be charged.14 The loans, however, were memoralized on
printed promissory note forms which specified a rate of interest,
usually six percent. The Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter Service], therefore, claimed that a portion of each payment by the
borrowers was interest pursuant to the terms of the printed promissory notes. Courts rejected this argument, after admitting evidence of the oral agreements between the lenders and the borrowers to refrain from charging interest, and held that the lenders had
no interest income in the absence of agreements to actually charge
5
interest.'
At the same time, however, these courts held that the rentfree use of corporate property bestowed an economic benefit upon
the recipient sufficient to generate gross income within the meaning of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. 6 These cases imputing income to recipients of the rent-free use of corporate property became the springboard for the Service's next line of attack
on interest-free loans, i.e., that the economic benefit derived from
using money without paying interest constituted income to the
to impose tax conseborrower. Courts again rejected this attempt
17
loans.
interest-free
to
parties
on
quences

B.

DEAN

and its Progeny.

The Service's first attempt to impute income to borrowers of
interest-free loans occurred in Dean v. Commissioner,'8 where the
taxpayers had obtained interest-free loans exceeding two million
dollars from a corporation controlled by them.' 9 The Service, rely13. D. Loveman & Son Export Co. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 776, 806 (1960), aff'd 296 F.2d
732 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 860 (1962).
14. See cases cited supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Peacock v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1958); Chandler v.
Comm'r, 119 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1941); Int'l Artists, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 94, 108
(1970); Runnels v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 762, 767 (1970); Hornung v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 428, 440
(1967); Heyward v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 739, 746 (1961), aff'd 301 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962);
Dean v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 256, 267 (1947), aff'd 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951); Reynard Corp. v.
Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 451, 453 (1934); Fruehauff v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 449, 450 (1934). Contra
Richards v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1940) (gift); Hillman v. Comm'r, 71 F.2d 688 (3d
Cir. 1934).
17. See cases cited supra note 1.
18. 35. T.C. 1083 (1961).
19. Id. at 1084.
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ing on the reasoning of the rent-free use of corporate property
cases, asserted that the free use of money produced an analogous
economic benefit for the borrowers, valued at the prime rate. 0 The
court rejected the Service's position and distinguished the rentfree use of corporate property cases.2 1 The court noted that recipients of the rent-free use of corporate property would have generated no deduction for the rent paid for such property, while borrowers would receive a deduction for interest paid. Given this
interest deduction, the court reasoned that any imputed income
would be offset by an imputed deduction and, therefore, the borrower received no taxable gain from an interest-free loan.22 The
court further justified this conclusion by relying on the cases denying an interest deduction to the borrower and refusing to impute
interest income to the lender. 3
The dissent 24 and commentators 25 attacked the majority's reasoning in Dean as distorting income and failing to adequately provide for situations where the interest deduction would be disallowed. 26 They argued that interest-free loans conferred an
economic benefit on borrowers and should be taxed consistently
with the rent-free use of corporate property cases. They analyzed
interest-free loans as a two-step transaction where the lender made
a loan at the market rate of interest accompanied by a dividend or
additional compensation sufficient to cover the interest and the
borrower retransferred the dividend or compensation to the lender
as interest. This analysis resulted in income and the possibility of
an interest deduction for the borrower. Some, however, even disputed the borrowers' right to an interest deduction.2 7
20. Id. at 1089.
21. Id. at 1090.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1091-92 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Arlinghaus and Blade, Interest Free Loans: A Myopic View of Income
Taxation, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 215 (1980); Joyce and DelCotto, Interest-FreeLoans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx. L. REv. 459 (1980); O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free
Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (1974); Perlman, Interest-FreeLoans, Recent Installments, 17
CREIGHTON L. REV. 71 (1983).
26. As the Dean dissent points out, the § 163 deduction does not apply universally to
payments of interest. See I.R.C. § 163 (1982), Section 265(2), for example, disallows any
deduction for interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations. Dean, 35 T.C. at 1092 (Bruce, J., dissenting); see I.R.C. § 265(2) (1982).
See, e.g., Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 168, 170 (W.D. Wis.
1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968); Bishop v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.
154, 158 (1963), aff'd 342 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1965).
27. I.R.C. § 163(a) limits the deduction to interest actually paid or accrued during the
taxable year, and borrowers in these situations do not actually pay or accrue any interest.
See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982). Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9459 at 84,658 (Ct. Cl.
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Despite these well-reasoned criticisms of Dean, courts, 8 with
few exceptions, 9 continued to adhere to it. Although these courts
recognized that the Dean holding could distort a taxpayer's taxable income and that its rationale might be inapplicable to a taxpayer who would not be entitled to an interest deduction, they refused to modify Dean in the absence of facts specifically raising
these issues. They held that lengthy administrative practice prior
to Dean coupled with fifteen to twenty years of judicial adherence
to Dean precluded judicial modification and referred the issue to
Congress.
C.

Section 482 Cases.

Where the lender and borrower are "organizations, trades, or
businesses . . . owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests,"8 0 the Service has been successful in imputing interest income to the lender under section 482. Initially, the tax
court resisted any attempts to "create" income for the lender and
upheld the reallocation of interest income to the lender only if the
borrower had used the proceeds of an interest-free loan to actually
generate income.3 1 Under the broad discretion granted by section
482 to reallocate income "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect... income," 2 the tax court permitted the imputation of the
income actually earned by the borrower to the lender.3"
The appellate courts, however, read section 482 more expansively, permitting the imputation of interest income to the lender
even when the borrower had not generated any income from the
loan proceeds. 4 These courts relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1),
(2), which permits reallocation any time the interest rate charged
was not equal to an arm's length rate, i.e., the rate charged in independent transactions between unrelated parties under similar
1982); see also, Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 25, at 474-76; O'Hare, supra note 25, at 1095;
Schifke, Taxing as Income the Receipt of Interest-Free Loans, 33 U. CM. L. REv. 346, 348,
350 (1966).
28. See cases cited supra note 1.
29. See cases cited supra note 3.
30. I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
31. See, e.g., Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 496, 510-11 (1972), rev'd 486 F.2d 1 (8th
Cir. 1973); Kerry Investment Co. v Comm'r, 58 T.C. 479, 486 (1972), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 928, 1008-09
(1970); Smith-Bridgman & Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 287, 293 (1951).
32. I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
33. See cases cited supra note 38.
34. See, e.g., Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Comm'r, 508 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kerry Investment Co., 500 F.2d at 110; Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 225,
232 (8th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Comm'r, 486 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1973).
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circumstances.3"
The tax court finally capitulated and upheld the imputation of
income where the borrower earned no income." Hence, the Service
had finally achieved reversal of the principles followed in the preDean lines of cases. This victory, however, did not alter the result
in Dean and its progeny that no income will be imputed to the
borrower of an interest-free loan. Moreover, the principles of section 482, which permit imputation of interest income to a lender
and perhaps an imputed interest deduction to the borrower, do not
extend beyond "organizations ... controlled ... by the same interests. ' '37 Thus, interest-free loans still permitted other taxpayers to
shift income without creating tax consequences to either the lender
or the borrower.
The Service finally achieved its objective of taxing interestfree loans consistently with other cost-free benefits when Congress
enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1984.38 That act attempts to tax all
transactions as consistently with economic reality as possible. Part
of that attempt is new section 7872, which creates income tax consequences for both lenders and borrowers of all below-market
loans.39
III.

SCOPE OF SECTION

7872

Newly enacted section 7872 sweeps broadly to encompass all
below-market loans that have a significant effect on federal tax liability whether they are gift loans, employment-related loans, corporate-shareholder loans, or other similar arrangements.4 0 The proposed regulations extend this scope to any extension of credit or
any arrangement whereby "the owner of money permits another to
use it for his own benefit for a period of time.... ",41 An integrated
series of transactions which is the equivalent of a loan will be cov35. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 588 F.2d at 1101; Kerry Investment Co., 500 F.2d at 109;
Liberty Loan Corp., 498 F.2d at 230.
36. Latham Park Manor, Inc v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 199, 213-16 (1977), aff'd 618 F.2d 100
(4th Cir. 1980).
37. I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
38. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
39. Congress accepted the Service's reasoning that interest-free loans are equivalent to
loans at the market rate of interest accompanied by additional transfers from lenders to
borrowers equal to the amount of interest. Failure to tax such loans in accordance with their
economic substance permitted taxpayers to avoid taxation of corporate income at the corporate level and the non-deductibility of certain interest payments. H. R. Rep. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1370, 1372-73, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 323, 325-26.
40. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 33,553, 33,560-61
(1985) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 1.7872-4) (proposed Aug. 20, 1985).
41. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-2, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,557.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/3

6

Willbanks:
No Longer Free:
Tax Consequences of Business Loans
BUSINESS
LOANS
1986] Interest-free Loans Are

ered by section 7872.42 In addition, a loan attributable to the relationship of the borrower or the lender to a third person will be
restructured as two loans, both of which will be subject to section
7872."s If an intermediary is used to avoid the application of the
section, the intermediary will be ignored and the borrower and the
44
lender treated as if the loan was made directly between them.
The taxpayer's characterization of a transaction will not control. Rather, the economic substance of the transaction will determine the application of section 7872." The test is whether the recipient of the money may use the funds for his own benefit. If so,
the rules of section 7872 apply even if he is the payor's agent, since
he is receiving an economic benefit. If he must use the funds solely
for the benefit of the payor, the section will not apply.48 For example, a bona fide prepayment for services or property made in a normal commercial manner will not be treated as a loan, but a refundable deposit will be.47
Pursuant to these rules, an advance to an employee, salesperson, or the like will not be considered a below-market loan if the
amount of the loan is reasonably calculated not to exceed the anticipated expenses and is made within a reasonable period of time
of the day that the expense will occur.48 On the other hand, extension of credit through use of a credit card will be treated as a below-market loan if the loan is a gift loan, a compensation-related
loan, a corporation-shareholder loan or a tax avoidance loan.49 Exactly when such commercial transactions will be treated as below50
market loans must await further regulations.
Section 7872 specificially includes all below-market loans
made directly or indirectly by employers to employees or independent contractors.51 The section implies that the purpose of the loan
is compensation whenever there is an employment relationship between the lender and the borrower. This assumption is justified,
because either the quid pro quo for the below-market loan is the
performance of past or future services or the loan is a gift, and
42. Id.
43. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 33,557.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(6), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,566.
50. The Service has requested public comment on the appropriate rules to apply to
credit card situations, Id. at 33,555.
51. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c),
50 Fed. Reg. at 33,560.
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gifts in the employment context are rare.
The proposed regulations specifically provide that a loan
which results partly from the performance of services will be
treated as a compensation-related loan if more than twenty five
percent of the amount loaned is attributable to the performance of
services.52 Even if a loan is classified as a compensation-related
loan, because more than twenty five and less than one hundred
percent of it is attributable to the performance of services, the remainder of the loan may or may not be subject to section 7872
depending on all the facts and circumstances.6 If less than twenty
five percent of the loan is attributable to the performance of services, the loan may still be subject to section 7872 if it is a corporation-shareholder loan, a tax avoidance loan, or it has a significant
effect on the tax liability of either the lender or the borrower.5 4
In addition, section 7872 imposes tax consequences on all
loans made directly or indirectly between shareholders and their
corporation. 55 Congress, however, failed to indicate which subsection controls if a corporation/employer makes a below-market loan
to a shareholder/employee. This situation may arise frequently in
closely-held corporations where shareholders are frequently employed by their corporations and even in publicly-held corporations where many employees own stock in their employer.
Proper classification of the below-market loan can significantly
alter its tax consequences. The shareholder/employee borrower will
have gross income pursuant to section 61 whether the loan is characterized as compensation or a dividend.56 Dividend treatment
might be preferable if the shareholder received no other dividends
during the year, because section 116 would exclude the first $100 of
such dividends from income.5 7 Corporation/employer lenders, on
the other hand, will be able to deduct compensation,58 but not a
dividend.
All the facts and circumstances must be considered in deter52.
53.

See 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,560.
Id.

54. Id.
55. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(C) (1982) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.7872-4(d), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.
56. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1982) (compensation); I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1982) (dividends).
57. I.R.C. § 116(a)(1) (1982) provides:
Gross income does not include amounts received by an individual as dividends
from domestic dorporations.
Constructive dividends appear to be within the purview of this section. See Treas. Reg. §
1.116-1(d) (1960); see also, Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3
U.C.LA. L. REV. 207, 233 (1956).
58. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982). See infra notes 119 to 124 and accompanying text.
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mining whether a payment from a corporation/employer to a
shareholder/employee is with respect to stock, and thus a dividend, 9 or compensation. Although a dividend may be disproportionate to stockholdings and some shareholders might receive
none, 0 any distribution that is closely related to stockholdings will
most likely be considered a dividend rather than compensation. 1
Benefits received by shareholder/employees that exceed benefits
received by nonshareholder/employees will be classified as a dividend.s In addition, the corporation's failure to pay dividends prior
to the below-market loan6 3 or a loan that absorbs all the corporation's earnings, 64 will indicate that the benefit of the below-market
rate of interest is a dividend rather than compensation.
The proposed regulations provide only one specific rule to distinguish corporation-shareholder loans from compensation-related
loans. 6 5 If a publicly-held corporation makes a below-market loan
to an employee who owns more than 0.5 percent of the total voting
power, or more than 0.5 percent of the total value of all nonvoting
shares, or more than 0.5 percent of the total value of all stock (voting plus nonvoting), the loan is presumed to be a corporationshareholder loan in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
59. A dividend only occurs when the corporation has earnings and profits. I.R.C. §
316(a) (1982). If a corporation makes a distribution with respect to its stock when it has
earnings and profits, the shareholder must report the full amount as ordinary income, but
may receive a $100 exclusion. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 116 (1982). If a corporation has no earnings
and profits, a distribution with respect to its stock is treated by a shareholder first as a
return of basis and second as gain from the sale or exchange of the stock. I.R.C. § 301(c)
(1982).
60. See, also, Clark v. Comm'r, 266 F.2d 698, 713 (9th Cir. 1959); Lengsfield v.
Comm'r, 241 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1957); Paramount-Richards Theatre, Inc. v. Comm'r,
153 F.2d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1946); Rev. Rul. 83-141, 1983-2 C.B. 65.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960); see also Kummer Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 511 F.2d 313,
315 (8th Cir. 1975); Alicia Ruth, Inc. v. Comm'r, 421 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1970); Biltmore
Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 288 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961);
San Marco Shops, Inc. v. Comm'r, 223 F.2d 702, 703 (5th Cir. 1955); Maggio Bros. v.
Comm'r, 6 T.C. 999, 1009 (1946); Gillies Frozen Custard, Inc. v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH)
311, 317 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Comm'r, 128 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 675 (1942); Mills Supplies Corp. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, 1229
(1947), afj'd 173 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1949).
63. See, e.g., Pacific Grains, Inc. v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1968); MilesConley Co. v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1949); Commercial Iron Works v.
Comm'r, 166 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1948); Carole Accessories, Inc. v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M.
1285, 1291 (CCH 1973); Barton-Gillett Co. v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. 679, 688 (CCH 1970).
64. See, e.g., Boyle Fuel Co. v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 162, 170 (1969); Gem Jewelry Co. v.
Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. 11, 13 (1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
846.
65. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(d)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.
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that it is compensation related. e6 Likewise, if a non-publicly held
corporation makes a below-market loan to an employee who owns
more than five percent of the total voting power, or more than five
percent of the total value of all nonvoting stock, or more than five
percent of the total value of all stock (voting plus nonvoting), the
loan is presumed to be a corporation-shareholder loan.6 7 Other situations will depend on the facts and circumstances discussed
above. Because the corporation/employer normally prefers compensation treatment, it must carefully document the purpose of
the loan to insure proper treatment.68
Section 7872 also applies to loans made indirectly by employers and corporations to their employees and shareholders.6 ' This
prevents employers and corporations from circumventing the consequences of section 7872 while bestowing the same economic benefit on their employees and shareholders. Indirect loans could be
made by third parties at the direction of employers and corporations or they could result from loans by employees and corporations to family members of employees and shareholders or to entities controlled by or benefitting such employees and shareholders.
Attribution rules such as those in sections 26770 and 31871 might be
applied. Pursuant to such rules, loans made to the parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, spouse and perhaps siblings of
the employee or shareholder, as well as loans to trusts, partnerships and corporations in which the employee or shareholder has
an interest will be attributed to him. An important factor in establishing these rules should be the probability of direct benefit to the
employee or shareholder. The proposed regultions do not specifically require the application of such attribution rules. Instead, they
state a broad rule based on all the facts and circumstances to include indirect loans within section 7872.72
Moreover, the proposed regulations also include loans between
a partnership and a partner if the loan is made to the partner for
services performed other than in his capacity as a partner.7 3 The
Service has also indicated that it intends to classify certain part66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The corporation has the burden of proving that the alleged compensation is ordinary and reasonable. Roth Office Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 172 F.2d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir.
1949).
69. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.78724(g), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.
70. I.R.C. § 267 (West Supp. 1985).
71. I.R.C. § 318 (West Supp. 1985).
72. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.
73. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c)(1)(iii), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,560.
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nership distributions as below-market loans subject to section
7872. Before issuing proposed regulations in this area, the Service
7 4
is soliciting public comments.
Section 7872 also encompasses below-market loans that are
neither business nor gift loans, but are designed to avoid federal
tax liability. 75 Such loans might arise outside the employment or
corporation/shareholder relationship. One example occurs when
the lender and the borrower are both controlled by the same interests but do not control one another. Specifically including such
loans emphasizes the primary thrust of this section, i.e., to eliminate tax avoidance through the use of below-market loans.
This purpose is also reflected in Congress' grant of authority
to the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to cover
any type of below-market loan which has a significant effect on the
tax liability of either the borrower or the lender.7 Thus, the Service need not establish the purpose of a below-market loan, only
its effect. This grant will include most below-market loans of any
magnitude since the imputation of interest income to the lender
will increase his gross income. Because of this, section 7872 will
apparently apply to loans to tax-exempt organizations. 77 This result will discourage such loans and possibly deny necessary funds
to these organizations.
Although the scope of section 7872 will not be clear until regu74. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,554.
75. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1985).
76. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1985).
77. Comments to the Treasury Department regarding proposed regulations have emphasized the importance of clarifying the possible application of § 7872 to certain tax-exempt organizations. "Continuing care" nursing home facilities have received special attention. Many such facilities charge new residents a refundable or partially refundable lumpsum entry fee; under the new rules, § 7872 could treat these arrangements as interest-free
loans. See I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985). The regulations should distinguish beween
traditional non-profit facilities, which use the deposits to establish reserves for health care
costs, and more financially sophisticated facilities which use fully refundable deposits as
sources of development capital.
In other situations, § 7872 will not generate tax consequences for tax exempt organizations since they are taxed only on unrelated business income. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (b) (1982).
A below-market loan would be considered a donation to such organization and, thus, not
unrelated business income. See I.R.C. § 513 (1982). The imputation of interest income to
the lender under § 7872 would have a significant effect on the-lender's tax liability unless
the amount of the loan was de minimis. § 7872 would, therefore, discourage lenders from
making such loans. See I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985). There can be no fear of tax avoidance by such lenders because they receive no income or gift tax deduction for such loans. A
loan is simply the right to use money, which is a partial interest. Section 170(f)(3) denies the
lender an income tax deduction for such contributions. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(3) (1982). Given
the effect of § 7872 upon the lenders, this denial is no longer justifiable. See I.R.C. § 7872
(West Supp. 1985); see also Willbanks, Interest-FreeLoans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Gift Loans, 47 MONT. L. REv. 39, 69-70 (1986).
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lations are issued or cases litigated, Congress has specifically excluded some loans from the coverage of section 7872. The first exclusion from section 7872 is only implicit; the section apparently
does not include loans of property other than money. The section
prescribes the tax treatment of "below-market loans." Such loans
are defined in terms of the "amount loaned" and the "rate of interest," both terms applying only to money and not other forms of
property. Apparently, Congress saw no need to provide tax treatment of loans of other forms of property at below-market cost
since courts had already imputed income to the recipients of such
property. 8 But corporations providing other property will avoid
the impution of rental income which would arise under section
7872. Failure to include all situations where a corporation/employer permits a shareholder/employee to use corporate property
at less than market rates creates inconsistent treatment of lenders
of money and lenders of other property and, thus, permits tax
avoidance by lenders of other property.79
Section 7872 also excludes loans to which sections 483 and
1274 apply.8 0 Section 483 imputes interest at a statutory rate on
contracts for the sale or exchange of property. The 1984 Tax Reform Act amended section 483 so that the applicable federal rate
of interest in section 1274(d) applies to both the determination of
the applicability of the section and the interest rate to be imputed
78. See cases cited supra note 16.
79. Section 132 excluding certain fringe benefits from gross income also fails to cover
this situation. See I.R.C. § 132 (West Supp. 1985). This section resulted after a long debate.
The Treasury issued a discussion draft of proposed regulations similar to new § 132 in 1975.
See 40 Fed. Reg. 41118-22 (1975) (to have been codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-16) (proposed
Sept. 5, 1975). These proposed regulations were withdrawn, 41 Fed. Reg. 56334 (1976), and
Congress imposed a moratorium on the issuance of new regulations. See Act of Oct. 7, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1(a), 92 Stat. 996 (1978). The moratorium was renewed twice. See Act
of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979); The Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349 (1981). A second set of proposed
regulations was released in 1981 but never published. See Proposed amendments to Reg. §
1.61-17-20 (1981), 8 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 53,563 (never published in the Federal Register),
discussed in Finneran, Fringe Benefit or "Condition of Employment": Uniformity, Certainty, and Compliance, 78 Nw. U.L.R. 198, 226 (1983), and Comment, The Taxation of
Nonstatutory Fringe Benefits: Setbacks in the Promulgaton of a Formal Policy, 11 CAP.
UL. REv. 55, 64 (1981). Congress finally enacted new § 132 in 1984. See The Tax Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 878 (1984).
Below-market loans were apparently never included in these discussions of fringe benefits. Section 7872 was a direct response to the Supreme Court decision in Dickman v.
Comm'r, 104 S.Ct. 1086 (1984), imposing gift tax consequences on the lender of an interestfree loan. See I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985).
80. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(8) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(2),
50 Fed. Reg. 33,553, 33,557 (1985). The proposed regulations indicate that section 7872 will
not apply even if these sections do not if the reason they do not apply is exceptions or safe
harbor provisions. Id.
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to the contract-" Likewise, section 1274 applies to debt instruments given in consideration for the sale or exchange of property
where the redemption price exceeds either the stated principal
amount or the imputed principal amount. 2 The same statutory
rates are used in all three sections, thus eliminating the possibility
of tax avoidance through taxpayers structuring the form of the
transaction.
The major exception to section 7872, however, is compensation-related and corporation-shareholder loans that do not exceed
ten thousand dollars.8 3 This exception applies to the aggregate
amount of loans outstanding between the borrower and the
lender.84 This exemption permits relatively modest economic benefits to be conferred tax free unless tax avoidance is one of the principal purposes of the loan. For example, if the applicable interest
rate is ten percent,8 5 the borrower receives an economic benefit of
one thousand dollars free. This is consistent with the thrust of section 7872 to penalize tax avoidance loans. Such minimal loans will
not significantly affect either the lender's or the borrower's tax liability. Moreover, such loans may be frequent and of short duration
and, therefore, difficult to account for. This exclusion is consistent
with new section 132 which excludes no-additional cost services,
qualified employee discounts, working conditions, and de minimis
fringe benefits from gross income" and analogous to the gift tax
annual exclusion. All are premised on the theory that accounting
for such transactions is unreasonable and administratively impossible. To attempt collection of tax in these situations would breed
contempt for, and thus evasion of, the system.
The Treasury Department, pursuant to authority specifically
delegated to it by Congress, has issued temporary and proposed
regulations exempting a number of transactions from the applica81. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(b) 98 Stat. 494, 553 (1984).
82. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(a) 98 Stat. 494, 538 (1984).
83. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985); see also 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,565.
84. For purposes of determining the amount of loans outstanding, a husband and wife
are considered to be one person. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(7) (West Supp. 1985).
85. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 172(c)(4), 98 Stat. 494, 703
(1984).
86. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), 98 Stat. 494, 878
(1984). The proposed regulations also contained an analogous administrative convenience
doctrine. See Proposed Tress. Reg. § 1.61-19, (1981) 8 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 53,563 (never
published in the Federal Register); discussed in Comment, The Taxation of Nonstatutory
Fringe Benefits: Setbacks in the Promulgationof a Formal Policy, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 55, 70
(1981), I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) specifically defines a de minimis fringe benefit as one that is so
small in value as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.
See I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
87. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
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tion of section 7872.88 These regulations exclude any loan which
does not have a significant effect on the tax liability of the lender
or the borrower. To determine whether the effect is significant, all
facts and circumstances are to be considered, including whether
items of income and deduction will offset each other, the amount
of these items, the cost of complying with section 7872, and the
non-tax reasons for structuring the transaction as a below-market
loan.

The regulations specifically list a number of transactions that
are exempt from section 7872. These include loans available to the
general public in the ordinary course of business; bank accounts;
publicly traded debt obligations if purchased at the publicly traded
price; life insurance loans made in the ordinary course of business;
loans subsidized by government units which are available under a
program of general application to the public; tax-exempt bonds;
United States obligations; certain loans to or from foreign persons;
loans to charitable organizations if such loans do not exceed ten
thousand dollars; and loans from a private foundation or charitable
organization in furtherance of its exempt purposes. Because these
types of loans are available to the general public in the ordinary
course of business, and are not designed to benefit an individual or
a select group, they do not create the possibility of tax manipulation and avoidance. If, however, tax avoidance is the principal purpose for one of these types of loans, section 7872 will apply.8 9
The regulations also exempt from section 7872 employee relocation loans that are designed specifically to assist the employee in
obtaining housing. This exemption only applies if the loan is a demand loan or a term loan that is not transferrable and is conditioned on the future performance of services and the employee
itemizes deductions.9 0 If these conditions are met, there will be no
significant tax effect from the loan since both the employer and the
employee will have offsetting income and deductions."'
Congress designed section 7872 to hinder tax avoidance
schemes while not creating obstacles to the ordinary course of business.92 The statutory and regulatory inclusions and exclusions
88. I.R.C. § 7872(g)(i)(C) (West Supp. 1985). The temporary regulations are effective
upon publication and ensure that immediate guidance is provided to taxpayers involved in
such transactions. The proposed regulations are identical to the temporary regulations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5 (1985) and 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,553, 33,561.
89. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,561.

90. Id.
91. See supra notes 56 and 58 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 94 to 124
and accompanying text.
92. H. R. Rep. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1370, 1371-73, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
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demonstrate an attempt to find this balance. Although not every
imaginable situation is detailed, Congress provided sufficient guidance to taxpayers in structuring their transactions and to courts in
resolving disputed cases.
IV.

DEMAND LOANS

All below-market business loans 93 exceeding ten thousand dollars will generate income tax consequences for both the lender and
the borrower. Because demand loans can be recalled at any time,
section 7872 taxes and values such loans differently from term
loans.9 ' For the purposes of section 7872, demand loans include not
only all loans payable in full at any time on the demand of the
lender, but also term loans which are not transferrable and which
contain interest arrangements conditioned on the future performance of substantial services. Thus, term loans that must be repaid
when the borrower terminates employment with the lender or term
loans that remain outstanding only as long as the borrower's productivity or the lender's profits remain above a specified level will
be treated as demand loans.9 6
Treating such term loans as demand loans means that the
Code Cong. & Ad. News 323, 324-26.
93. The proposed regulations provide detailed rules for determining whether a loan
actually qualifies as a below-market loan. The first step is to determine the appropriate rate
of interest against which to test the loan. The proposed regulations provide for rates based
on annual, semiannual, quarterly and monthly compounding of interest. The proposed regulations require that the interest compounding period of the loan or the payment interval,
whichever is shorter, determines which specific applicable federal rate is appropriate. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,558. If a loan requires interest equal to
the appropriate rate, it is not a below-market loan.
If the parties readjust the interest rate, either under the terms of the original loan
agreement or due to renegotiation, the loan is treated as a new loan and is compared with
the applicable federal rate for that day to determine if it is subject to section 7872. Again,
the parties have the advantage of the lower of the statutory rate or the alternate monthly
rate. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,559.
Loans requiring interest based on objective indices will not be considered below-market
loans if that interest rate is no lower that either the statutory or alternate interest rate for
each semiannual period the loan is outstanding. One way to ensure this is to use the applicable federal rate as the index. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(1), (e)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33,559.
94. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) and (b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
95. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(5),
50 Fed. Reg. at 33,566.
96. This treatment of an employee benefit matches I.R.C. § 83's treatment of "property transferred in connection with the performance of services." The requirement of continued employment, productivity or profits is analogous to the "substantive risk of forfeiture" rules in I.R.C. § 83(c)(1). See I.R.C. § 83(a), (c)(1) (1982). In fact, the proposed
regulations under § 7872 incorporate § 83's definition of performance of services. See 50
Fed. Reg. at 33,566.
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amount of foregone interest deemed transferred from the lender to
the borrower and retransferred from the borrower to the lender
each year will remain constant. Lenders and borrowers of true
97
term loans are taxed pursuant to the original issue discount rules.
These rules require that increasing amounts are taken into income
by the lender and deducted by the borrower over the life of the
loan. "8 Because the amount of income determined by an original
issue discount analysis depends on the term of the loan, such an
analysis becomes inapplicable when the term of the loan is subject
to change. The alternative to treating below-market term loans,
conditioned on the future performance of substantial services as
demand loans, would be to recalculate the lender's income and the
borrower's deduction upon early termination of the loan and either
to amend prior tax returns or to permit an adjustment in the year
of termination of the loan. Such a process would add a great burden to the tax system, and few taxpayers could be expected to undergo the difficulty of recalculation and adjustment. The differences in tax revenue would not be sufficient to justify such
complexity.
True demand loans and term loans treated as demand loans
due to the requirement of the performance of future services differ
in one respect-the calculation of the amount of foregone interest.
Section 7872 defines foregone interest simply as the interest which
would have been payable if the loan were made at the applicable
federal rate over any interest actually payable.9 9 The applicable
rate for demand loans is the federal short-term rate under section
1274(d). 100 This rate is adjusted twice annually to permit taxation
of below-market demand loans to correspond with changes in the
marketplace.101
The proposed regulations under section 7872 provide guidance
97. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.787210(a)(5), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,563.
98. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
99. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2) (WestSupp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(a), 50
Fed. Reg. at 33,558.
100. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985). The proposed regulations under § 7872
permit the parties to a below-market demand loan to use the lower of (1) the Federal statutory short-term rate in effect for the semiannual period as determined under section 1274(d)
or (2) the alternate Federal short-term rate which is established by the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service on a monthly basis. If a demand loan remains outstanding beyond
one semiannual period, the applicable alternate Federal rate is the one in effect for the first
month of the semiannual period (i.e., January or July). See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.78723(b)(2), (b)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,558.
101. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(B), (C) (West Supp. 1985). The alternate Federal rates are
established by the Commissioner on a monthly basis. See 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,558. These
rates permit taxpayers to take advantage of falling interest rates.
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on how to calculate the amount of foregone interest. 102 If the loan
remains outstanding for an entire calendar year, the taxpayers use
a "blended annual rate" that is determined by combining the applicable federal rates for the entire year. 10 3 If a demand loan does
not exceed $250,000 and remains outstanding for less than the entire year, the taxpayer may either calculate the exact amount of
foregone interest assuming daily compounding of interest or approximate that interest by multiplying the principal amount of the
loan by one-half the applicable federal rate (based on semiannual
compounding) and then by the fraction of the semiannual period
the loan was outstanding."" If the loan is outstanding during more
than one semiannual period, the taxpayers must perform this calculation for each such period. These rules reduce the number and
complexity of taxpayer computations, thereby reducing the opportunity for error and increasing the likelihood of taxpayer
compliance.
The applicable federal rate for term loans treated as demand
loans is the federal rate in effect under section 1274(d) on the date
the loan is made.1 0 ' Thus, even though the applicable rates change
every six months, the rate in effect on the date the loan is made
will apply even though the term loan is treated as a demand loan.
Moreover, the appropriate rate depends on the term of the loan.
The short-term rate, which applies to demand loans, applies only
to term loans which do not exceed three years.10 6 If the term of the
7
loan is between three and six years, the mid-term rate applies.10 If
the term of the loan exceeds six years, the long-term rate applies.1 08 Thus, if the term of the loan is five years, the mid-term
rate applies. That rate may differ from the short-term rate and,
therefore, generate more or less income for parties to a term loan
treated as a demand loan than for a true demand loan. 0 9 Finally,
102. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,568.
103. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,568.
104. See Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,568.
105. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.787213(e), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,568.
If the condition to perform future services is removed or lapses, the loan is no longer
treated as a demand loan. Rather, it is then treated as a new term loan. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(5), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,559.
106. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. For example, from January 1, 1985, to June 30, 1985, the annual short-term rate
is 12.37%, while the annual mid-term rate is 13.37%. Rev. Rul. 84-163, 1984-2 C.B. 179. For
example, if L loaned B $100,000, interest-free, for five years, contingent upon B's continued
performance of services, B's imputed income would be calculated on the basis of an interest
rate of 13.37%. Each year the amount of income would be $100,000 x .1337 or $13,370.00.
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the rate for term loans will be compounded semiannually.1" 0 Such
compounding reflects the attempt by Congress to treat lenders the
same as other investors. Most investments provide for compound,
rather than simple, interest. This requirement of section 7872 further reflects the congressional choice to focus on lenders and their
attempts to avoid tax liability.
Section 7872 treats the amount of foregone interest calculated
according to these applicable federal rates as transferred from the
lender to the borrower and retransferred from the borrower to the
lender on the last day of the calendar year.1 ' The first imputed
transfer generates income for the borrower and possibly a deduction for the lender, while the second imputed transfer creates income for the lender and a deduction for the borrower. The exact
consequences depend on whether the loan is compensation-related
or a corporation/shareholder loan.
Permitting a borrower to use money without paying interest
confers an economic benefit on the borrower. This economic benefit consists of the interest charge the borrower would have had to
incur if he borrowed from an independent third-party. No one has
seriously challenged the fact that a 2below-market loan confers an
economic benefit on the borrower."
The borrower realizes this benefit and has dominion and control over the benefit continuously during the tax year while the
lender refrains from demanding repayment. Prior to 1984, demand
loans presented a problem, because the lender retained the power
to reclaim his money at any time. As a result, it could be argued
that the lender, rather than the borrower, has control over the economic benefit of the below-market loan. 1 3 Unless the borrower
had dominion and control over it, the economic benefit of using
money cost-free would not be included in his gross income." 4 Section 7872 overcomes this problem, and the related valuation problem by characterizing the demand loan as a series of daily loans.
The measure of the borrower's income is then simply the sum of
On the other hand, if the loan had been a demand loan, the interest rate would change every
six months. Assuming the rate stayed constant during 1985, which is unlikely, B's income
for that year would be only $12,370.00 ($100,000 x .1237).
110. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
111. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(b),
50 Fed. Reg. at 33,562-63. If the borrower dies or is liquidated or terminated, the imputed
transfers are deemed to occur on the last day of the borrower's tax year. Id. If the loan is
repaid, the imputed transfers are deemed to occur on the date of repayment. Id.
112. See cases cited supra note 1.
113. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961); Glenshaw Glass Co. v.
Comm'r, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); Lewis v. United States, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951).
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the benefit flowing from each daily loan.11 5
Once the borrower has realized the benefit and has control
over it, section 61 requires inclusion of the benefit in his gross income. " 6 Borrowers can avoid this result only if a specific section
excludes this benefit from gross income. Section 102, which excludes gifts, will not apply to business loans. Section 116, however,
which excludes the first $100 of dividends received by the taxpayer
should apply to below-market loans to shareholders." 7 If the borrower receives the loan as an employee, however, this exclusion will
not apply, and the full amount of foregone interest will be included
in his gross income as compensation." 8
Likewise, the characterization of the loan will affect the ability
of the lender to deduct the amount of foregone interest. If the loan
is related to compensation, the lender/employer should be entitled
to a deduction because section 7872 treats the lender as if it actually made the payment." 9 This should be sufficient to justify a deduction under section 162(a)(1) as long as the total compensation
provided to the employee is reasonable.1 0 If the lender is not making a compensation-related loan, it will receive no deduction.
Even though it will receive no deduction, the lender will be
treated as receiving interest income. 121 Although a lender receives
no economic benefit per se from making a below-market loan, it
could be investing that money. Section 7872 simply imputes a reasonable rate of return to the lender. Moreover, lenders do receive a
benefit from such loans in the form of services from employees or
the continued investment of capital from shareholders.
Finally, the retransfer of the amount of foregone interest from
the borrower to the lender creates an interest deduction for the
borrower."22 This deemed retransfer should satisfy the requirement
of section 163 that interest actually be paid."1 3 The payment of in115. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,568.
116. I.R.C. § 61 includes income from whatever source derived. See I.R.C. § 61 (1982).
This section has always been interpreted broadly to reach all forms of income. See cases
cited supra note 114.
117. See supra note 55.
118. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
119. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) allows a deduction for any ordinary and necessary business expense paid or accrued during the year. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982).
120. See supra notes 57 to 63 and accompanying text.
121. The proposed regulations specifically characterize this second imputed transfer as
interest. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-6(c), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,563.
122. Id.
123. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982) provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.
See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Comm'r, 655 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1981), reviewing 70 T.C. 240
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terest alone, however, is insufficient to justify an interest deduction
if no interest is legally due."" This obstacle should be overcome by
section 7872 itself, particularly because the section also imputes
income to the borrower. The imputed interest deduction simply
offsets this imputed income.
This treatment of below-market demand loans meets commentators' objections to Dean'2 5 and provides consistent taxation of
analogous situations. First, the borrower's taxable income is no
longer distorted. The imputation of income to the borrower will
raise his adjusted gross income and, thus, increase his possible
charitable deduction and decrease his possible medical deduction. 2 6 Moreover, section 7872 will not automatically permit the
borrower an interest deduction if he is not othewise entitled to it,
for example, because he fails to itemize or he uses the proceeds to
7
purchase or carry tax-exempt securities.'
Second, section 7872 provides much-needed consistency between analogous situations. Below-market borrowers now have income imputed to them similarly to recipients of the right to use
other forms corporate property rent-free.' 2 8 Borrowers, however,
will receive an imputed interest deduction while other recipients
receive no such deduction. Investing the loan proceeds in incomeproducing property justifies such a deduction, because interest is
simply another cost of producing income.' But section 163 sweeps
more broadly than the production of income, permitting a deduction for interest paid on such items as home mortgages and consumer credit. Unless Congress amends the Code to restrict the interest deduction to income-producing situations,' 30 analogous
(1978); Battelstein v. Comm'r, 631 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); Heyman v. Comm'r, 70
T.C. 482, 487 (1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1980); Wood v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. 1113,
1116 (1983); cases cited supra note 5; see also Comment, Battlestein v. Internal Revenue

Service: Deductibility of Interest Payments Financed by Additional Loans from the Same
Lender, 35 TAx LAW. 375 (1981).
124. See cases cited supra note 5.
125. See supra notes 18 and 24 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 26.
128. See cases cited supra note 16.
129. Costs of producing income are deductible under § 162 (trade or business expenses) or § 212 (production of income). See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1982).
130. Early income tax statutes appeared to limit the interest deduction to situations
where the taxpayer had corresponding interest income or the interest was business-related.
See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282 (1864); Act of March 3, 1865,
ch. 78, § 1, 13 Stat. 469, 479 (1865); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 478
(1867); Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 9, 16 Stat. 256, 258 (1870); see also Berger, Simple
Interest and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 219-20 (1981). In 1894, however, Con-

gress had abandoned this distinction and permitted a deduction for all interest due or paid
in the tax year. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1894). Given this lengthy
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situations will receive inconsistent tax treatment.
Section 7872 also creates identical tax consequences for belowmarket loans and economically equivalent transactions. A belowmarket loan produces the same economic effect as a market-rate
loan accompanied by a second payment of compensation or a dividend equal to the amount of interest. 1 ' The payment of such compensation or dividend generates income for the borrower and a deduction for the employer/lender, but not for the corporation/
lender. 1- 2 The payment of interest produces income to the lender
and a deduction for the borrower. Section 7872 now imposes these
identical tax consequences on below-market loans.
Section 7872, however, does not achieve perfect symmetry. If
the lender charges the market rate interest and subsequently forgives the interest, the borrower will have gross income from the
discharge of the debt,'33 but no interest deduction since no interest
is paid. 34 Moreover, the lender will have no interest income. Likewise, if a third party paid the borrower's interest obligation, the
borrower would have income' 33 but no deduction, 3 ' and the lender
would still have interest income. Thus, the tax consequences of
these two situations currently differ from that of the below-market
loan.
Applying the rationale of section 7872, however, to these two
situations would produce identical tax treatment to that of belowmarket loans. In the first situation, where the lender forgives the
interest, the Code should treat the parties as if the borrower actually paid the lender and then the lender retransferred the same
amount to the borrower. As a result, the lender would have imhistory and the political implications of repealing the deduction for interest on home mortgages, it appears unlikely that § 163 will be amended to limit the deductibility of interest to
taxpayers who use the loan proceeds to generate income despite well-reasoned criticisms of
the broad scope of § 163. See Williams, It's High Time to Get Homeowners' Deductions
Under Control, 12 Tax Notes 963 (1981); Samuelson, The Homeowner Break: An Entrenched Hoax, 11 Tax Notes 1147 (1980); see also National Low Income Housing Coalition
- Memo to Members (Jan. 1984) 23 Tax Notes 550 (1984).
131. See, e.g., Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting); Joyce and Del Cotto, Interest-FreeLoans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAx
L. REv. 459 (1980); Keller The Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans From Corporations to Shareholders and From Employers to Employees, 19 B.C. L. REv. 231 (1978); Keller, The Tax Treatment of Interest-Free Loans: A Two-Transaction Approach, 1 VA. TAX.
REV. 241 (1981); see also O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 27 VAND. L. REv.
1095 (1974).
132. See supra note 39.
133. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1982).
134. See supra note 123.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1960).
136. See supra note 16.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986

21

MONTANA
LAW
Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 47REVIEW
[1986], Iss. 2, Art. 3

[Vol. 47

puted interest income and the borrower an imputed interest deduction. In addition, the137borrower would have imputed income
from the second transfer.

The same result occurs where a third party pays the borrower's interest obligation. In this situation, the third party should
be considered as making the payment to the borrower rather than
the lender. This payment produces income to the borrower. '
Then the borrower should be considered as transferring this payment to the lender which will justify the borrower's interest deduction and generate interest income for the lender.
The proposed regulations attempt to remedy these inequities.
They specifically provide that waiver, cancellation, or forgiveness
of interest payments will be treated as if the interest had actually
been paid by the lender and then retransferred by the lender to
the borrower if the loan was one that would have been subject to
section 7872 if no interest had been charged. 139 Moreover, the payment of interest by a third party might also be swept within the
rules of section 7872 if the reason for that payment is to avoid the
tax consequences of section 7872 since the statute and the regula14 0
tions evidence a clear intent to curb tax avoidance schemes.
Such treatment creates both horizontal and vertical equity.
Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers be
treated alike. Section 7872 and the proposed regulations move in
that direction by taxing parties to below-market loans the same as
parties to two-payment transactions, the recipients of other forms
of corporate property, parties to those situations where lenders forgive interest, and parties to those situations where third parties
pay the borrower's interest obligation. Vertical equity, on the other
hand, requires that taxpayers at one end of the spectrum be
treated no differently than taxpayers at the opposite end. A major
factor in vertical equity is that taxation be correlated with ability
to pay. Because below-market loans occur more frequently among
higher-bracket taxpayers, failure to tax parties involved in such
loans produced vertical inequity. Again, section 7872 attempts to
137.

This income might be compensation if the lender is the borrower's employer or it

might be a dividend if the borrower is a shareholder of the corporation. As such, it would be
included in the borrower's gross income. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), (7) (1982). If the lender is a family member, the forgiveness of interest might be considered a gift and, thus, excluded from
gross income. I.R.C. § 102 (1982).
138. Id.
139. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11(a), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,566.
140. The proposed regulations include as below-market loans a series of transactions
that have the same economic effect. They also provide for disregard of intermediaries and
restructuring of indirect loans if necessary to curb tax avoidance schemes. See Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.7872-2(a), 4(g), 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,557.
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remedy this situation.
By attempting to reach all economically equivalent transactions, section 7872 moves in the right direction, overruling courts
which refused to impute either income to lenders or borrowers or a
deduction to the borrowers.' 4 1 The price it exacts in doing so is
complexity in valuation.' 42 Such complexity is justified, at least for
demand loans, because of the need to report income accurately and
tax economically equivalent transactions identically.
V.

TERM LOANS

Below-market term loans generate similar, but not identical,
tax consequences. 143 Borrowers will have income on the date of the
loan and be entitled to interest deductions over the term of the
loan. Depending on the character of the loan, lenders may receive a
deduction on making the loan, and all lenders will have imputed
interest income over the term of the loan. The primary differences
between term and demand loans lie in the calculation of these
amounts and the timing of the tax consequences.
Demand loans present a difficult problem in valuation, because the lender retained the power to reclaim his money at any
time. As a result, measuring the value of the economic benefit flowing to the borrower was impossible until termination of the loan.
Section 7872 overcomes this difficulty by treating demand loans as
if renegotiated each year and, therefore, values them at the close of
each calendar year.144 This fiction is unnecessary for term loans
which by definition remain outstanding for a specified length of
time. Because the economic benefit to the borrower can be measured at the time the below-market term loan is made, section
7872 treats the lender as paying, and the borrower as receiving, on
the loan date an amount of cash equal to the difference between
the amount lent and the present value of all payments, both principal and interest, required by the loan."45 This cash amount constitutes income to the borrower and measures any deduction available to the lender.
Although analogous to the amount of foregone interest, this
141. See cases cited supra notes 1, 5, and 6.
142. See supra notes 94 to 110 and accompanying text.
143. I.R.C. § 7872(b) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-7, 50 Fed.
Reg. at 33,563.
144. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-6, 50
Fed. Reg. at 33,562-63.
145. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985); see also Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.7872-7, 50
Fed. Reg. at 33,564.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986

23

MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW
Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 47
[1986], Iss. 2, Art. 3

[Vol. 47

cash amount is calculated differently. Both the amount of foregone
interest and the cash amount depend on the applicable federal rate
defined in section 1274(d). While the amount of foregone interest
is calculated pursuant to the short-term rate, the cash amount is
calculated pursuant to the short-term, the mid-term, or the longterm rate depending on the length of the loan.1 46 Moreover, section
7872 requires that this rate be compounded semiannually for term
1 47
loans, but not for demand loans.
For example, assume that the L loans B $100,000 on January
1, interest-free. If the loan were a demand loan and the applicable
rate ten percent for the entire year, B's income would be
$10,000.
If L did not demand repayment for five years, B would
have income of $10,000 for each year, assuming that the interest
rate remained at ten percent. On the other hand, if the loan were a
term loan with no payments due for five years, B's income in the
year of the loan would be the difference between the loan amount
($100,000) and the present value of the right to receive $100,000 in
five years ($61,391.33) or $38,608.67."' s B must report this full
amount as income in the year the loan is made. Because of this,
term loans create a significant disadvantage for borrowers. In addition, borrowers do not receive an interest deduction equal to the
amount of imputed income in the year the loan is made to offset
this income. Rather, borrowers' interest deductions are spread
across the life of the loan.
The second difference between term and demand loans arises
from the timing of the lender's income and the borrower's deduction. Instead of allowing the borrower to deduct the entire amount
of imputed income in the year of receipt, section 7872 requires
both lenders and borrowers to determine these tax consequences
under the original issue discount (OID) rules. 4 " These rules produce increasingly larger amounts of income to the lender and, thus,
increasingly larger interest deductions for the lender.
Pursuant to section 1272, the lender's income and the borrower's interest deduction equal the sum of the daily portions of
15
OID for each day during the tax year the loan is outstanding. 1
146. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The proposed regulations provide that taxpayers may use the lower of the statutory rate or alternate rates that the Commissioner
establishes on a monthly basis. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(4), 50 Fed. Reg. at
33,559.
147. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2).
148. The proposed regulations provide examples of how to calculate the present value.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-14, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,569.
149. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(2).
150. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/3

24

1986] Interest-free Loans AreBUSINESS
LOANS
Willbanks:
No Longer Free:
Tax Consequences of Business Loans
The daily portion of OID is the ratable portion of the increase in
the adjusted issue price over the accrual period.'" An accrual period means the six-month period ending either on the maturity
date of the loan or the date six months preceding this maturity
date. 5 2 The adjusted issue price is the issue price plus the increase
in that price for the prior accrual period.' 53 Finally, the increase is
54
simply the adjusted issue price times the yield to maturity.1
In the preceding example, the issue price is the present value
of receiving $100,000 in five years of $61,391.33. The yield to maturity, determined on the basis of compounding at the end of each
accrual period (i.e., semiannually) and properly adjusted for the
length of the accrual period, is five percent. Assuming the loan was
made on July 1, 1984, the amount of L's income and B's deduction
is computed as follows:
Accrual
Period

Adjusted
Issue Price

Yield to
Maturity

Increase in
Issue Price

7/1/84 12/31/84

$61,391.33

.05

$3,069.5665

1/1/85 6/30/85

$64,460.897

.05

$3,222.0448

7/1/85 12/31/85

$67,683.942

.05

$3,384.1971

$71,068.139

.05

$3,553.407

$74,621.546

.05

$3,731.0773

$78,352.623

.05

$3,917.6312

$82,270.254

.05

$4,113.5127

6/30/88

$86,383.767

.05

$4,319.1883

1/1/88
6/30/88

$86,383.767

.05

$4,319.1883

7/1/88 12/31/88

$90,702.955

.05

$4,535.1478

$95,238.103

.05

$4,761.905

1/1/86

-

6/30/86

7/1/86

-

12/31/86
1/1/87 -

6/30/87

7/1/87

-

12/31/87

1/1/88

-

1/1/89 7/1/89

The increase is then prorated over the six-month accrual period to determine the daily portion of OID. The lender's income,
and correspondingly the borrower's deduction, is simply the sum of
I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3).
I.R.C. § 1272(a)(5).
I.R.C. § 1272(a)(4).

Id.
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these daily portions. Thus, in the above example, L's income and
B's deduction for 1984 is $3,069.56. In 1985 it is $6,607.23.
The tax treatment of term loans again corresponds to the taxation of the economically equivalent, two-payment transaction.
The borrower has income, and the lender a possible deduction, on
the receipt of the loan whether it is at below-market rates or at
market rates and accompanied by an additional payment of compensation or dividend. But the tax consequences generated by imposing the OID rules on the parties to a below-market term loan
differ from those imposed on the parties to the two-payment transaction. In the two-payment transaction, the borrower's deduction
and the lender's income depend on the interest payment schedule,
which may require annual interest payments or even no payments
until the termination of the loan.
The below-market loan most nearly resembles the market-rate
loan with no interest due until maturity. A comparison of the
lender's income under each situation demonstrates the disadvantage created by imposing the OID rules on below-market loans. For
example, if L lends B $100,000, for five years at ten percent interest, L's income and B's deduction would be $50,000 in the fifth
year. If L lends B $100,000, interest-free for five years, when the
applicable rate is ten percent, L's income and B's deduction would
be $6,292.61 in the first year, $6,937.61 in the second year,
$7,648.71 in the third year, $8,432.70 in the fourth year, and
$9,297.06 in the fifth year.
This difference exists because Congress chose to value belowmarket loans by reference to lenders' investments rather than the
cost of borrowing.155 Such focus on lenders is appropriate. Lenders
control the existence and conditions of the loans. Moreover, although borrowers have income from below-market loans, they also
have offsetting deductions, while many lenders will have income,
but no offsetting deduction. Finally, the primary purpose of taxing
below-market loans is to prevent lenders from shifting income to
lower-bracket taxpayers.
The choice of the OID rules to measure lenders' income reflects a central theme of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 to tax income
when it is actually earned, rather than when it happens to be
paid. 156 This is necessary to prevent tax avoidance schemes based
on deferral of income. Lenders who required no interest payments
until maturity may defer all taxes until the termination of the
155. See Willbanks, Interest-Free Loans are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of
Gift Loans, 47 MONT. L. REv. 39 (1986).
156. See Halpern, The Time Value of Money - 1984, 25 Tax Notes 751 (1984).
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loan. This creates an additional advantage to lenders who receive a
deduction on making the loan, for example, employers. The advantage resulting from deferral is not offset by the detriment to borrowers produced by reporting income currently and deferring deductions, because borrowers are usually in lower tax brackets than
lenders. In addition, borrowers have the right to use lenders'
money without paying for this privilege until the termination of
the loan.
Having chosen the OID rules for lenders, Congress had no
choice but to impose those rules on borrowers. Again, the timing of
the borrower's deduction must correspond to the timing of the
lender's income to prevent tax avoidance schemes.
Because of these rules, below-market term loans impose the
worst possible tax consequences on borrowers: current income and
deferred deduction. But they still permit a tax advantage for lenders, such as employers, who receive a current deduction on making
the loan. These lenders receive a current deduction accompanied
by partial deferral of income.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The proper tax treatment of below-market business loans
presented an interesting dilemma to Congress. On one hand, Congress obviously needed to tax such transactions to provide consistency with economically equivalent transactions. Moreover, any attempt to keep the tax consequences simple and straightforward
presented the opportunity for further tax avoidance. On the other
hand, complexity in valuation and timing will lead to taxpayer error with greater costs in the collection process. Exact taxation may
well discourage the use of below-market loans and, thus, intensify
the search for more sophisticated means of transferring economic
benefits outside the scope of section 61. New and even more complex Code provisions will be necessary to counter such maneuvers.
Despite this, section 7872 is justified. Existing case law
presented the possibility of distortion of income through understatement of adjusted gross income. Failure to tax both lenders
and borrowers allowed lenders to shift or defer income. Moreover,
the need for consistency in the tax system to create equity overrides the possible increased cost of collection. Finally, Congress did
provide a de minimis exception to exclude small loans not intended to shift income to lower bracket taxpayers. This provision
should be sufficient to encompass benefits to shareholders, employees, and others that are not designed to avoid taxation. Beyond
this, precision and consistency is vital.
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